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## AIMS OF THE MEDIEVAL CRUSADES AND HOW THEY WERE VIEWED BY BYZANTIUM.<sup>1</sup>

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The history of medieval crusading may be conveniently divided into two chapters. The first of these chapters would end with 1291 when Acre was lost by the Christians and would cover the period extending backward to 1095 when the first crusading expedition was launched. During this period the western Christians conquered and lost the Holy Lands. They also established themselves in Greece and the Greek archipelago. The second chapter would come down to 1395, the year of the battle of Nicopolis, or possibly 1444, the year of Varna. During this period, though there is considerable talk and some action for the recovery of the Holy Land, the struggle has really become one for the defense of Europe against the invading Turks.<sup>2</sup>

The motivating forces which prompted the various crusading expeditions were many and complex and for that reason difficult to determine. I know of no body of material the study of which will give a clear and definite idea of what they were. To find them, if indeed it is possible to find them, we shall have to examine each expedition in detail. That obviously, unless we resort to generalities, will be a long and tedious task. But among these expeditions the one which laid the pattern for the rest was that launched in 1095 at Clermont. We shall, therefore, analyze that expedition, determine its motives if we can, and draw any inference which may explain the nature of those that came later.<sup>3</sup>

The crusade of 1095 was a holy war having as its objective the liberation of the Holy Land. It had, however, a distinct form of its own. The essence of this form lay not in the fact that it was directed against the infidels, nor in the fact that its ultimate military objective was the liberation of the Holy Land. These are features that can be found in previous wars. The Spanish wars of the eleventh century, for instance, were fought in the name of the faith,<sup>4</sup> as was also the war of the Normans in Sicily,<sup>5</sup> though in both instances the desire for conquest was no doubt the stronger motive. The Byzantines fought their great wars in the tenth century not only in the name of the faith, but envisaged also the liberation of Jerusalem. "I shall conquer your lands," Nicephorus Phocas wrote to the caliph, "and I shall go as far as Mecca where I shall erect a throne to the greatest of beings," *i. e.*, Jesus. "Then I shall direct myself towards Jerusalem, a city rendered

illustrious for us by the most powerful Being. . . . I shall conquer all the Orient and the Occident and I shall spread everywhere the religion of the cross."<sup>6</sup> The same objective was expressed by the successor of Nicephorus, John Tzimiskes. Describing his successful campaign of 974 against the Moslems in Syria and Palestine to the Armenian king Ashod III, Tzimiskes wrote:<sup>7</sup> "Our desire was to liberate the Holy Sepulchre from the outrages of the Moslems."

A feature of the crusade of 1095 was the fact that those losing their lives while participating in it were absolved of their sins.<sup>8</sup> As an enticement for the faithful to enlist in the expedition the grant of indulgence was very important and was to become a permanent feature of the crusade viewed as an institution. But the grant of indulgence by itself was not what gave the expedition of 1095 as a holy war its peculiar form, for indulgences for fighting the infidels had been granted before, as for instance, in the Spanish wars of the eleventh century.<sup>9</sup> It was rather the fact that it was called, organized and conducted under the auspices of the papacy that did this. The holy war, hitherto conducted haphazardly, was, at Clermont, taken over by the church. It became the medieval crusade.

There is little doubt, although Urban's speech in its original form has not come down to us,<sup>10</sup> that the pope made the liberation of Jerusalem the principal theme of the appeal which he made at Clermont. But the question is to know what were the motives which moved the pope to make his appeal when he did. In the motives of the pope lay the objectives of the crusade.

Now motives in general are difficult to discover, but they are more difficult still when documentation, as in this case, is fragmentary. This explains why there has been no agreement on the part of scholars as to the motives which prompted Urban to call his crusade. For some, it was because he desired to promote and make safe the pilgrimages to Jerusalem that he made his appeal for the war.<sup>11</sup> For others, it was because he wished to bring fraternal succor to the Christians of the East.<sup>12</sup> Others still view Urban's war as an attempt to direct the increasing energies of Europe away from home and so insure the observance of the truce and peace of God.<sup>13</sup> Some believe that what the pope wanted was the establishment of a feudal state in Palestine under the suzerainty of Rome,<sup>14</sup> while others think that his main objective was to increase the power and the prestige of the papacy.<sup>15</sup> There are those also who believe that the end of the Greek schism and the ultimate unification of all Christendom under the aegis of Rome was what the pope had uppermost in his mind.<sup>16</sup>

In one or more of these explanations lies, I think, the solution of the problem. But in which one? Our answer to this question would be greatly facilitated if we could discover the happening, which, occurring

as near to 1095 as possible, suggested to the pope the idea of liberating Jerusalem. We can find such a happening, I think, if we turn our attention to the relations which existed then between the Byzantine emperor, Alexius Comnenus, and the Papacy.

There is no doubt now that the relations between Urban and the Byzantine emperor became cordial almost from the very beginning of Urban's pontificate. The documentation for this is too ample, indeed official, to need any further elaboration.<sup>17</sup> In the establishment of this cordiality, it was the pope who took the initiative, but the emperor was no less anxious to come into some kind of agreement. The big problem, of course, which stood in the way was the fact that for almost seventy years now<sup>18</sup> there had been no communion between the church of Constantinople and that of Rome and the obstacles to the reestablishment of communion were insurmountable. These obstacles were, on the one hand, the deep-rooted attachment of the Greeks to their ecclesiastical autonomy, and, on the other, the universalism of the papacy.<sup>19</sup> Negotiations, however, were not impossible, for the papacy believed that the emperor could force the Greek church to do his bidding, while the emperor had at his disposal the well known Byzantine doctrine of *economia*, which he might use to apply pressure on the Greek church, if, for political reasons, an agreement with the papacy was desirable.

Negotiations actually began in 1088 at the suggestion of Urban. These negotiations envisaged the union of the churches, but political considerations were doubtless also involved.<sup>20</sup> On the one hand, the pope, struggling to maintain himself against a rival who had the support of Henry IV, was no doubt anxious to prevent a rapprochement between the latter and the Greek emperor, such as had taken place during the pontificate of Gregory VII.<sup>21</sup> Alexius, on the other hand, hoped probably that an understanding with the pope, who was on excellent terms with Roger of Sicily, might help to prevent another invasion of his realm by the Normans in Italy. But whether it was this or another objective which Alexius had in mind, there can be no doubt that whatever it was, it was political in nature. For it is difficult to assume that Alexius would go against the tradition of the Greek church in order just to satisfy the papacy. That no Byzantine emperor ever did either before or after Alexius, and Alexius was every inch a Byzantine and one among the cleverest.

The negotiations between pope and emperor were crowned with success, at least temporarily. The excommunication, which had been imposed on the Byzantine emperor by Gregory VII, was removed and the Latin churches in Constantinople were reopened. There is some evidence also, although it is by no means conclusive, that Urban's name was temporarily inscribed in the diptychs of the church of Constantinople<sup>22</sup> pending the holding of a council which, it was hoped, would set-

tle the difference which separated the two churches and so bring about their union. The council was never held and consequently the union of the churches was not effected, but the important point to emphasize is this, that, throughout the negotiations, Alexius urged the point of view of the pope as against the arguments of the Greek clergy. This willingness of the Byzantine emperor to push the union with Rome must have impressed the pope and led him to hope that the union of the churches might still be brought about. Meanwhile pope and emperor remained on cordial terms. This the Byzantine emperor tried to exploit in order to raise troops in the west for his wars against his enemies. It is in this effort of Alexius to use the papacy for the recruitment of troops in the west that lies the secret of Clermont, but to unravel this secret one must go back to the council of Piacenza, held in the spring of 1095, and where Byzantine ambassadors appeared to ask the pope to help their emperor in his struggle against the infidels.

Chalandon, the historian of the reign of Alexius Comnenus, following Riant, has denied that at Piacenza Alexius had appealed to the western church for military assistance.<sup>23</sup> He gives as his reason this, that by 1095, the year of the council of Piacenza, the situation of the Greek empire had so improved that there was no need for Alexius to make humble appeals to the west for aid. But to say this is to misinterpret the position of the Byzantine emperor, for underlying this statement is the assumption that Alexius, having successfully repulsed the attacks against Constantinople, would remain still, making no efforts to recover the lands which the Turks had seized. There is, of course, no basis for this assumption. No one in Byzantium had relinquished the rights of the empire over Asia Minor. After all, Mentzikert had been fought only twenty-four years before, and it was not quite fifteen years since Nicaea had been occupied by the Turks. But we know for certain that in 1095 or thereabout Alexius contemplated taking the offensive against the Turks.<sup>24</sup> For this, however, he needed more troops than he could raise in his own domain, hence his appeal at Piacenza. These troops were for offense, not defense.

We are told that at Piacenza, Urban II urged many of those present to furnish the aid asked by the Byzantine emperor, "even engaging them to promise under oath to go there with the consent of God and bring to this same emperor, to the best of their power, their most faithful aid against the pagan."<sup>25</sup> But the significance of Piacenza lies not in this; it lies in something more momentous: In the plea for help which the Byzantine ambassadors made before the assembled prelates at Piacenza, they put the emphasis on the necessity of liberating the Holy Lands. Listen to the chronicler who reports this—(he is talking about Alexius who, he says, was now ready to take the offensive against the Turks):

"Having considered, therefore, that it was impossible for him alone to undertake the battle on which everything depended, he recognized that he would have to call on the Italians as allies and he affected this with considerable cunning, adroitness and deeply laid planning. For finding a pretext in the fact that this nation considered unbearable the domination of Jerusalem and the life-giving Sepulchre of Our Saviour Jesus Christ by the Persians and seeing therein a heaven-sent opportunity, he managed, by dispatching ambassadors to the bishop of Old Rome and to those whom they would call kings and rulers of those parts (*i. e.*, the west), and by the use of appropriate arguments, to prevail over not a few of them to leave their country and succeeded in directing them in every way to the task. That is the reason why many of them, numbering thousands and tens of thousands, having crossed the Ionian Sea, reached Constantinople with all speed. And, having exchanged assurances and oaths with them, he advanced towards the east. With the aid of God and their alliance and by his own efforts he speedily expelled the Persians from Roman territories, liberated the cities and restored his sway in the east to its former glory. Such was this emperor: great in the conception of plans and the doing of deeds."<sup>26</sup> This description of Alexius as "great in the conception of plans and the doing of deeds" is perhaps more accurate than that given by Gibbon when he writes: "In a style less grave than that of history I should perhaps compare the emperor Alexius to the jackal, who is said to follow the steps, and to devour the leavings, of the lion."<sup>27</sup>

There is no doubt, writes Fliche—and he did not know our passage—that the thought of the crusade was strange to the pope when he left for France after Piacenza, but it seems none the less sure that the pontiff had been moved by the tale about the sufferings of the Christians of the east which the Byzantine ambassadors had recounted at Piacenza and that would lead him in the course of the year 1095 to form the project of the crusade. In this statement Fliche recognizes the significance of the council of Piacenza in the evolution of Urban's thought about the crusade.<sup>28</sup> We have been able to go still further. We have shown that the question of liberating Jerusalem was brought up at Piacenza; it was brought up by the Byzantines in the interest of imperial policy. We have thus found the happening which, occurring shortly before Clermont, suggested to the pope the idea of a war that would free the Holy Land. We are not here implying, of course, that this idea was not known in the west.<sup>29</sup> If it were not known it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to bring about its execution. It is the timing of the suggestion in relation to Clermont that we are emphasizing.

Now that we know how the pope came to conceive the project of his crusade we can look for his motives in the different versions we have of the speech he delivered at Clermont, in the pope's instructions



to the assembling crusaders and in his relations with the Byzantine emperor. These documents and what we know of Urban's relations with the Byzantine emperor reveal, I think, three dominant motives:<sup>30</sup> the spiritual exaltation that would come upon the whole of Christendom if the holiest of its cities were liberated; the desire to bring succor to the eastern Christians and the hope that thereby one might bring to an end the Greek schism; and finally, the expectation that the war, by drawing the more bellicose elements away from the west, would help in the enforcement of the truce and peace of God. These were the pope's motives. What he knew of the wars in Spain and the frequent pilgrimages to Jerusalem must have been the factors which led him to believe that his plea would meet with a ready response.

The motives of the pope were not, of course, the motives of all those who actually participated in the expedition. Many of the participants, among the leaders especially, men like Bohemond, Tancred, Baldwin and the Genoese and Pisans, were moved by more worldly considerations.<sup>31</sup> The rank and file, however, despite the depredations that they might have caused even among Christians, were led to join the expedition by a sincere and simple piety. Anna Comnena, who did not particularly like the Latins, is a witness to this.<sup>32</sup>

The crusade as it was conceived and organized by the pope was something which the Byzantine emperor had not anticipated. The liberation of Jerusalem was for him only a pretext. His real purpose in sending an embassy to Piacenza was to prevail upon the pope to help him recruit troops for his contemplated offensive for the recovery of Asia Minor. Here I would like to repeat a story with which Gibbon introduces his account of the arrival of the crusading armies in Constantinople.<sup>33</sup> "In some Oriental tale," writes Gibbon, "I have read the fable of a shepherd who was ruined by the accomplishment of his own wishes; he had prayed for water; the Ganges was turned into his ground, and his flock and cottage were swept away by the inundation." Then Gibbon continues: "Such was the fortune, or at least the apprehension, of the Greek emperor Alexius Comnenus . . . His ambassadors had solicited a moderate succor, perhaps of ten thousand soldiers; but he was astonished by the approach of so many potent chiefs and fanatic nations." "The approach of so many potent chiefs and fanatic nations" doubtless astonished Alexius, but, unlike the shepherd of Gibbon's tale, Alexius was not swept away by the inundation. With an adroitness rarely exhibited in history, not only did he avoid any major clashes with the crusading armies but managed to direct them in such a way as to realize, at least in part, his main objective, the reconquest of Asia Minor from the Turks.

The reconquest of Asia Minor was Alexius' main objective, but as the crusading armies arrived in Constantinople, he seems to have

thought of still another: The creation of a Latin state in the Orient under his suzerainty which might serve as buffer between his empire as he hoped to reconstitute it and the Islamic world. We are told by the author of the *Gesta Francorum* that Alexius promised to grant Bohemond, if the latter took the oath of fidelity to him, a piece of land *ab Antiochia retro* fifteen days march in length and eight days march in width.<sup>34</sup> I am aware, of course, that the authenticity of this passage has been contested, but frankly I cannot follow the reasoning for its rejection.<sup>35</sup> I fail to see how the phrase *ab Antiochia retro* can be translated in any other way than *au delà d' Antioch* as Brèhier translates it<sup>36</sup> or "beyond and behind Antioch" as E. Jamison does.<sup>37</sup> Thus translated, there can be no question of Antioch's being included in the grant promised by the emperor to Bohemond and consequently the arguments put forth for the rejection of the passage lose all their potency. The region involved was located beyond Antioch, no doubt in the direction of Aleppo, over which the Byzantines could still have a vague claim, as the emirs of Aleppo, down to about the middle of the eleventh century, acknowledged the suzerainty of the empire. The passage of the *Gesta* is perfectly understandable and should be retained as authentic. Bohemond, placed in command of a region in the midst of the Moslem world, would not only serve as a buffer for the empire but would be permanently removed from Italy. Such indeed seems to have been the thought of Alexius, but in this he failed completely, for Bohemond chose to keep Antioch. This, as is well known, not only brought about the final break between Alexius and the crusaders, but was to prove a continuous source of trouble between Greeks and Latins.

The crusade which Urban molded at Clermont and immediately after, became an institution which for centuries to come would be used to agitate Europe and the Near East. The essence of that institution, as we have said, was the fact that it could be authorized only by the papacy. As it was originally fashioned it was to be used to protect the interests of Christendom against the infidels, but the infidels were not the only ones who might endanger these interests. Moreover, the interests of Christendom came to be looked upon as being synonymous with those of the papacy. The crusade, as a consequence, became an instrument to be used by the papacy as the papacy saw fit. It might be authorized against the infidels, as indeed it was, or it might be called against schismatics as was the crusade of 1107, authorized by Pope Paschal II in order to help Bohemond in his struggle against the Byzantine emperor Alexius I. It could be used, and was used, to extirpate heresies—the Albigensian crusade immediately comes to mind—or to fight secular rulers—one thinks of the crusades against the later Hohenstaufens and Peter of Aragon—whose policies clashed with those of the papacy. It was even used against the personal enemies of the pope as was the crusade which



Boniface VIII directed against the Colonna family.<sup>38</sup> These uses, to be sure, were repeatedly denounced as abuses and contributed not a little in eventually discrediting the crusade,<sup>39</sup> but given the nature of the crusade and the absolutism of the papacy, they were only a natural development. Crusading, of course, was a complex phenomenon in which many and varied motives—and that of piety was one of the strongest—were involved, but the crusade as an institution became, as time went on, an instrument of absolutism, which, to be sure, sometimes got out of control.

This instrument, which Alexius had helped to fashion, the Greeks came to view either as a dangerous thing or as a means of aid in their struggle to preserve their empire. If Manuel Comnenus agreed to permit the armies participating in the Second Crusade to march through his territories it was largely because he feared that if they went by way of Sicily they might be won over by Roger II who was then planning an attack against the Byzantine empire. But he hoped also that he might use these armies in the defense of the empire, as is shown by the fact that he tried to win Louis VII in an alliance against Roger of Sicily.<sup>40</sup> He failed in this; his object thereafter was to weaken the crusading armies so that they would not accomplish anything that might prove dangerous to his empire. Above all, he did not want the principality of Antioch strengthened. In expressing this view, I am basing myself not on Odo of Deuil,<sup>41</sup> who is notoriously anti-Greek, but on the Byzantine historian Nicetas Choniates.<sup>42</sup>

Manuel, like his illustrious grandfather, managed to prevent the crusaders from inflicting major injuries on his empire. But the Second Crusade, like the First, contributed greatly in the growth of antagonism between Greek and Latin. This antagonism, fostered by the ecclesiastical bigotry of both sides, the economic stranglehold which the Italians had come to have upon the empire, and the hostility of the Greeks against the increasing influence of the Latins in the administration of the empire, was to make of the crusade the means for the destruction of the empire. Already during the Second Crusade there was an element in the camp of Louis VII—it was headed by Godfrey de la Roche, bishop of Langres—which urged the capture of Constantinople.<sup>43</sup> Some years later, at the time of the Third Crusade, the Angeli were frightened when they heard of the coming of Frederick Barbarossa and quickly entered into negotiations with Saladin.<sup>44</sup> The destruction of the Byzantine empire was finally achieved by the fourth expedition. The empire was later, at least in part, restored, but the Fourth Crusade made the chasm which had come to separate Greek and Latin virtually unbridgeable. This chasm was to be widened still more in the course of the next three centuries. And here again the crusade contributed its part. For the Byzantine emperors in their efforts either to avoid the use of the crusade

against the empire or to get its help in their struggle against the Ottomans had to agree to the union of the churches on terms dictated to them by Rome. But this was against the wishes of the majority of the Greek clergy and the Greek people. Dissension at home and an increased hatred of the Latins was the consequence. Many Greeks came to prefer the Turks rather than submit to the Latins. Thus the crusade, launched in part in order to bring about the unity of Christendom, became in the course of its history, a source of disunity.

In the approximately three hundred and fifty years of its existence the crusade did much harm both in the east and in the west. Whether it did any good is open to doubt. But crusading, as a historical phenomenon, was a significant movement.

1 This paper was read at the sixty-sixth annual convention of the American Historical Association, held in New York City on December 28, 29, 30, 1951.

2 A group of American and European scholars are now engaged in the writing of a five-volume work which will cover the entire crusading movement. For the prospectus of this work see K. Setton, in *Speculum*, XXVI (1951), 578ff. Meanwhile Steven Runciman has begun the publication of *A History of the Crusades* which will be completed in three volumes, of which the first has made its appearance: S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades — Volume I: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem*. (Cambridge, 1951). Some of the older works remain, of course, useful. Among them we cite the following: F. Wilken, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Leipzig, 1807-32), 7 volumes; R. Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem* (1100-1291) (Innsbruck, 1898); B. Kugler, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Berlin, 1891); T. A. Archer and C. L. Kingsford, *The Crusades: The Story of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London, 1895); L. Bréhier, *L'Eglise et L'Orient au Moyen Age: Les Croisades* (Paris, 1928); R. Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem* (Paris, 1934-36), 3 volumes; A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938). Atiya does not treat of Varna, but about that campaign we have now a monograph: O. Halecki, *The Crusade of Varna. A Discussion of Controversial Problems* (New York, 1943). Volume five of the projected work mentioned at the beginning of this note will include a general bibliography.

3 The First Crusade, as is natural, has been repeatedly treated. Besides the works already cited one may add the following: H. von Sybel, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges*, 2nd edition (Leipzig, 1881); R. Röhricht, *Geschichte des*

*ersten Kreuzzuges* (Innsbruck, 1901); A. C. Krey, *The First Crusade. The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants* (Princeton, 1921); F. Chalandon, *Histoire de la Première Croisade jusqu'à l'Élection de Godefroi de Bouillon* (Paris, 1925). Other works, pertinent to this study, will be cited in the course of the paper.

4 P. Boissonnade, *Du Nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland* (Paris, 1923), 5ff.; Boissonnade, "Cluny, la Papauté et la première grande Croisade internationale contre les Sarrasins d'Espagne," *Revue des Questions Historiques*, CXVII (1932), 257-301; P. Rousset, *Les Origines et les Caractères de la Première Croisade* (Neu-Châtel, 1945), 31-35.

5 E. Jordan, "La Politique Ecclésiastique de Roger Ier et les Origines de la Légation Sicilienne," *Le Moyen Age*, 2e série, XXIV (1922), 237-284; continued, *Ibid.*, XXV (1923), 32-65; Rousset, *op. cit.*, 36-39.

6 G. Schlumberger, *Un Empereur Byzantin au Dixième Siècle: Nicéphore Phocas*. Nouvelle édition (Paris, 1923), 349f.

7 Matthew of Edessa, *Chronicle*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Documents Arméniens*, I (Paris, 1869), 13-20.

8 On this point Urban II is reported by Fulcher of Chartres to have said the following at Clermont: "Remission of sins will be granted for those going thither, if they end a shackled life either on land or in crossing the sea, or in struggling against the heathen. I, being vested with that gift from God, grant this to those who go." *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Documents Occidentaux*, III (Paris, 1866), 324. The translation is that of M. E. McGinty, Fulcher of Chartres, *Chronicle of the First Crusade* (Philadelphia, 1941), 16. In his letter to the assembling Crusaders Urban II refers to the crusade "as a preparation for the remis-

- sion of all their [the participants] sins." *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, I (Paris, 1881), 220. On this whole point see further N. Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter* (Paderborn, 1922-3), I, 195ff; E. Magnin, "Indulgences," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XVII (Paris, 1923), 1607; H. C. Lea, *A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church*, (Philadelphia, 1893), III: 9-10.
- 9 C. Erdmann, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte*, VI, Band) Stuttgart, 1935, 125. Cf. Rousset, *op. cit.*, 48ff. The remission of sins under certain conditions had also been promised to those participating in the expedition which Robert Guiscard organized against Byzantium in 1080. Gregorii VII *Registrum*, VIII, 6: Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CXLVIII (Paris, 1853), 580f.
  - 10 Urban's speech at Clermont has been differently reported by a number of chroniclers. Two of these chroniclers (Robert the Monk and Baldric of Bourgueil) say that they were present at Clermont; it is quite probable that two others (Fulcher of Chartres and Guibert of Nogent) were also there. A fifth (William of Malmesbury) reports that he derived his information from persons who actually heard the speech. All these chroniclers recorded their version of Urban's speech some years after Clermont. On this whole question see D. C. Munro, "The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont, 1095," *The American Historical Review*, XI (1905), 231-242.
  - 11 Bréhier, *op. cit.*, 54; A. Hatem, *Les Poèmes épiques des croisades, genèse, historicité, localisation* (Paris, 1932), 72; J. Calmette, *Le Monde Féodal*, Vol. 4 of the collection *Cléo* (Paris,) 382; E. Joranson, "The Great German Pilgrimage of 1064-1065," in *The Crusades and other Historical Essays Presented to Dana C. Munro* (New York, 1928), 42-43.
  - 12 F. Duncalf, "The Pope's Plan for the First Crusade," in *The Crusades and Other Historical Essays . . .*, 45; B. Leib, *Rome, Kiev et Byzance à la Fin du XIe Siècle* (Paris, 1924), 181.
  - 13 Rousset, *op. cit.*, 194ff.; Bréhier, *op. cit.*, 60-61.
  - 14 J. L. LaMonte, "La Papauté et les Croisades," in *Renaissance*, II and III (1945), 158. In this article LaMonte gives a brief summary of some of the explanations offered for the motives of Urban II.
  - 15 K. Hampe, *Deutsche Kaisergeschichte in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer*, 7th edition (Leipzig, 1937), 76. Cf. M. W. Baldwin, "Some Recent Interpretations of Pope Urban II's Eastern Policy," *The Catholic Historical Review*, XXV (1940), 462.
  - 16 A. C. Krey, "Urban's Crusade—Success or Failure," *American Historical Review*, LIII (1948), 235-50; M. N. Baldwin, "The Papacy and the Levant during the Twelfth Century," *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, III (1945), 277-287. Leib, *op. cit.*, 181; Runciman (*op. cit.*, 102ff) seems to imply that the desire for the union of the churches was a dominant motive in the thoughts of Urban.
  - 17 W. Holtzmann, "Die Unionsverhandlungen zwischen Kaiser Alexios I und Papst Urban II in Jahre 1089," *Byz. Zeitschrift*, XXVIII (1928), 38-67; P. Charanis, *The American Historical Review*, LIII (1948), 941-944.
  - 18 Precisely when the break came is not known, but it was some years before 1054, probably during the patriarchate of Sergius II (1001-1019). On this question see Martin Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantin* (Paris, 1941), 166 ff.
  - 19 There has been a tendency in recent years to minimize the significance of the schism of the eleventh century, for instance Runciman (*op. cit.*, 100), referring to 1087, the year of the death of Gregory VII, writes: "There was as yet no actual schism." See also G. Every, *The Byzantine Patriarchate*, 451-1204 (London, 1947), 153 ff. This point of view, I think, is much of an exaggeration. I shall treat of it in another study, but see P. Charanis, *The American Historical Review*, LIII: 943 f.
  - 20 A. Fliche, *La Réforme grégorienne et la Reconquête chrétienne*, volume 8 of *Histoire de l'Eglise*, edited by A. Fliche and V. Martin (Paris, 1946), 236 f.
  - 21 F. Chalandon, *Essai sur le Règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène*, 1081-1118 (Paris, 1900), 68ff.
  - 22 Jugie, *op. cit.*, 242; V. Grumel, "Jerusalem entre Rome et Byzance: Une lettre inconnue du patriarche de Constantinople Nicolas III à son collègue de Jérusalem (vers 1089)," *Echos d'Orient*, XXXVIII (1939), 115. Both Jugie and Grumel express the view that Urban's name was temporarily inscribed in the diptychs of the church of Constantinople, but see my critique of this view in *The American Historical Review*, LIII: 943. Runciman, without citing either Jugie or Grumel, rejects this view completely; Runciman, *op. cit.*, 103.
  - 23 Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène . . .*, 155ff; also, *Histoire de la première croisade . . .* 17-18 Comte Riant, "Inventaire critique des lettres historiques des croisades: Ier partie," *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, I (Paris, 1881), No. XXXV, p. 101-105. See also Edward Tuthill, "The Appeal of Alexius for aid in 1095," *The University of Colorado Studies*, IV (Boulder, 1907), 135-143.
  - 24 Without knowing the document upon which this study is based, Fliche wrote in 1927: "Without a doubt, as Chalan-

- don observes, the situation of the Greek empire in 1095 was not alarming, but could not Alexius I nourish at this date the project of restoring the Byzantine power in Asia by recovering the regions occupied by the Turks . . . ? For the realization of such a dream foreign aid could be, if not indispensable, at least, very useful." Fliche, "Urbain II et la croisade," *Revue d'Histoire de l'Eglise de France*, XIV (1927), 291-293. For further references to scholars who have rejected Chalandon's view, see P. Charanis, "Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First Crusade," *Byzantion*, XIX (1949), 25f. See also D. C. Munro, "Did the Emperor Alexius I ask for aid at the Council of Piacenza, 1095?", *The American Historical Review*, XXVII (1922), 731-733; M. W. Baldwin, "Some Recent Interpretations of Pope Urban II's Eastern Policy," *The Catholic Historical Review*, XXV (1940), 460.
- 25 Bernold of St. Blaise, *Chronicon*, MGH, SS, V, p. 462.
- 26 The chronicler in question is Theodore Skutariotes who wrote during the second half of the thirteenth century. Despite the fact that his testimony is late, its credibility, as I have shown in a special study, where I also give the passage quoted above in the Greek original, cannot be questioned. See Charanis, *Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First Crusade* 30 ff. The text with an English translation was also published by me in *Speculum*, XXIV (1949), 93-94. Skutariotes does not mention the Council of Piacenza, but, in view of the conditions of the empire which his passage presupposes, the imperial ambassadors of whom he speaks must have been those who are reported by Bernhold to have spoken at Piacenza. Bernhold, *op. cit.*, 462. On Skutariotes and the credibility of his chronicle, especially for the period of the early Comneni, see further G. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica I. Die Byzantinischen Quellen der Geschichte der Türkenvölker* (Budapest, 1942), 329f.
- 27 Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, edited by J. B. Bury (London, 1898), VI: 322.
- 28 Fliche, *La Réforme grégorienne et la Reconquête chrétienne* 1057-1125, 273. Cf. Erdmann, *op. cit.*, 301ff; W. Holtzmann, "Studien zur Orientpolitik des Reformpapsttums und zur Entstehung des ersten Kreuzzuges," *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, XXII (1924-25), 190ff.
- 29 On December 7, 1074 Gregory VII wrote to the emperor Henry IV that he was organizing an expedition of fifty thousand men in response to the appeals of the Greeks. If possible he would command it himself and would go as far as Jerusalem. Gregory VII, *Registrum*, Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CXLVIII, 385-387. On this question of the origin of the idea of a united Christian effort for the liberation of the Holy Land see Erdmann, *op. cit.*, 145 ff; Ursula Schwerin, *Die Aufrufe der Päpste zur Befreiung des Heiligen Landes von den Anfängen bis zum Ausgang Innocenz IV* (Berlin, 1937), 68ff. Concerning the encyclical of Sergius IV which Erdmann accepts as authentic, see A. Gieysztor, "The Genesis of the Crusades: The Encyclical of Sergius IV (1009-1012), I," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, V (1948), 3-24; II, *Ibid*, VI (1950), 3-35.
- 30 The speech of Urban II as reported by the chroniclers: Fulcher of Chartres, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux*, III (Paris, 1866), 323-324; Robert the Monk, *Ibid*, 727-730; Baldric of Bourgueil, *Ibid*, IV (Paris, 1879), 12-15; Guibert of Nogent, *Ibid*, IV; 137-140; and William of Malmesbury, *De Gestis Regum Anglorum*, edited by William Stubbs, *Rolls Series*, II (London, 1889), 393-398. On Urban's instructions to the assembling crusaders see, "Urbain II aux princes de Flandres et à leurs sujets," in *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, I (Paris, 1881), 220.
- 31 This motive for gain is well illustrated by the reaction of Tancred at the time of the siege of Antioch to the suggestion that a contingent of crusaders should occupy the fort of Antioch which was located near the monastery of Saint George on the left bank of the Orontes. "If I knew," he said, "what profit will come to me, I would occupy the fort with my men alone." L. Bréhier (editor and translator), *Histoire Anonyme de la Première Croisade* (Paris, 1924), 98.
- 32 Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, II (Bonn, 1878), 32.
- 33 Gibbon, *op. cit.*, 287.
- 34 Bréhier, *Histoire Anonyme de la Première Croisade*, 30.
- 35 A. C. Krey, "A Neglected Passage in the Gesta and Its Bearing on the Literature of the First Crusade" in *The Crusades and Other Historical Essays Presented to Dana C. Munro* (New York, 1928), 57-78.
- 36 Bréhier, *Histoire Anonyme* . . . , 31.
- 37 E. Jamison, "Some Notes on the *Anonymi Gesta Francorum*, with Special Reference to the Norman Contingent from South Italy and Sicily in the First Crusade," in *Studies in French Language and Mediaeval Literature presented to Professor M. K. Pope* (Manchester, 1939), 193-95.
- 38 Paulus, *op. cit.*, II; 27ff; H. Pissard, *La guerre sainte en pays chrétien* (Paris, 1912), 121ff.
- 39 The crusade as an institution was already subjected to criticism in connection with the Third Crusade. See George B. Flahiff, "Deus non Vult: A Critic

- of the Third Crusade," in *Mediaeval Studies*, IX (1947), 162-188. But it was the misuse of the institution that gave rise to more and more criticism. For this see Palmer A. Throop, "Criticism of Papal Crusade Policy in Old French and Provençal," in *Speculum*, XIII (1938), 379-412; also by the same author, *Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda* (Amsterdam, 1940).
- 40 On Manuel Comnenus and the Second Crusade see F. Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène (1118-1443) et Manuel I Comnène (1143-1180)* (Paris, 1912), 263-315.
- 41 We have now a new edition with an English translation of Odo of Deuil. Odo of Deuil, *De protectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, edited, with an English translation by Virginia G. Berry (New York, 1948).
- 42 Nicetas Choniates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1835), 88-89.
- 43 Odo of Deuil, *op. cit.*, 69, 79.
- 44 F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453*, II (Munich, 1925), 95; K. Zimmert, "Der deutsch-byzantinische Konflikt von Juli 1189 bis Februar 1190," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XII (1903), 42-77.